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Abstract 
 
This working paper proposes the concept of democratic efficacy and provides a first 
empirical illustration of it using European Social Survey (ESS) data. The concept 
has been designed to capture the way subjective sentiments toward politics—i.e., 
external and internal political efficacy—are connected to ‘objective’ individual 
capacities that are assumed to promote democratic behavior. It has two components: 
political efficacy and democratic capacities. Four types of political efficacy are 
specified based on two variants—i.e., external and internal political efficacy: high 
political efficacy (PE), low political efficacy (PE), paternalists, and skeptics. 
Democratic capacities consist of political knowledge, news consumptions, political 
attachment, political values, and political skills. People with complete democratic 
capacities have: (1) a certain level of factual political knowledge; (2) consumed news 
regularly; (3) non-intensive partisans; (4) identities with core values of democracy—
i.e., political and legal equality, tolerance toward dissenting opinion, and individual 
autonomy—and (5) had some involvement in political activities (as a proxy of skills). 
The concept of democratic efficacy is a typology created from the two concepts. This 
typology has eight categories. The empirical test suggests that the democratic 
component is suitable to introduce additional analytical distinction into the concept 
of political efficacy. The role of context in this conceptualization is twofold: 
contextual factors are both treated as predictor and moderator variables. They are 
assumed to shape the level of democratic efficacy, but they also affect its behavioral 
consequences. We collected several context-level indicators from international 
datasets that can be tested as predictors or moderators.
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Introduction 
 
In this report, we conceptualize the term of democratic efficacy and empirically test it on the 
dataset of the 8th round of the European Social Survey (ESS). The concept of democratic 
efficacy is an analytical framework to understand the challenges of populism and to provide 
guidance for actions and interventions. The term is designed to capture the way subjective 
sentiments toward politics—i.e., external and internal political efficacy—are connected to 
‘objective’ individual capacities that are assumed to promote democratic behavior. The concept 
of democratic efficacy thus embodies both subjective (attitudinal) and ‘objective’ (measurable 
individual skills) dimensions. Also, as DEMOS interprets populism as a sign of mismatch 
between the operation of the polity and citizens’ needs, facing the challenges of populism 
necessitates taking into account the role of both sides: the system and the individual. 
Democratic efficacy should be interpreted in its context; therefore, it is important to uncover 
how contextual factors shape it and how its working and effects on political behavior is 
conditioned by those factors.  
In line with this idea, we argue that this term consists of two dimensions: political efficacy and 
democratic capacities. Also, it is important to discuss the role of context. In the report below, 
we work out each of these aspects and connect them to each other. The 8th round of the ESS is 
used to test the concept because this survey covered most of the indicators and country cases 
we use. It is important to note that this dataset is not complete in light of our conceptualization. 
First, it did not measure one of the indicators of our concept, political knowledge. Second, it 
measured the concept of political efficacy, news consumption, and partisan attachments in a 
different way than that which we suggest in this report. Third, some of our country cases were 
not covered by the 8th round of the ESS. As a result, the findings presented here do not contain 
individual-level data from Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovakia, and Denmark. Despite these 
shortcomings, after reviewing all cross-country databases available, this dataset seems to be the 
most appropriate to use since it covers most of the indicators and country cases we need for 
testing and illustrating our concept of democratic efficacy.    
 
Political efficacy 
 
The concept of political efficacy (PE) was originally formulated to capture citizens’ subjective 
attitudes toward politics, more specifically, their notions about their role and position within 
the political system. As Campbell and his colleagues (1954), the inventors of the term, put it: 
“Sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual political action does 
have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform 
one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the 
individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (187). Over the next few 
decades, as an important predictor of political participation, the concept of political efficacy 
gained huge popularity in political behavior research (see Abranson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 
1985; and Robinson, 1976). 
The term has undergone significant alterations since its birth. Most importantly, the original 
concept has been divided into two separate components: one external and one internal variant 
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(Balch, 1974). External political efficacy (EPE) refers to “beliefs about the responsiveness of 
governmental authorities and institutions to citizens demand” (Niemi et al, 1991: 1408). Thus,  
it represents a subjective perception of the role of citizens in general within the political system, 
while internal political efficacy (IPE) refers to “beliefs about one’s own competence to 
understand, and to participate effectively in, politics” (Niemi et al, 1991: 1407), thereby 
indicating a subjective conception of the role of respondents in particular within the political 
system. The validity of this distinction has been subsequently demonstrated (Balch, 1974; Craig 
et al, 1990), and research showed that their different combinations can produce diverse 
outcomes in political behavior (Craig, 1980; Pollock, 1983, Feldman et al, 2015). 
In line with these findings, people can be divided into four general groups based on their level 
of political efficacy. Some people have a high level of PE on both dimensions: they believe in 
both the responsiveness of the political system and their political competences to influence it. 
Its reverse form is when one has low level of PE in both dimensions. Those perceive politics to 
be difficult to shape by ordinary people. A mixed type is when one thinks that the political 
system cares about people’s will (higher EPE), but do not feel herself as capable of meaningful 
participation (lower IPE). As these people believe in the political system more than in 
themselves, they can be labeled as ‘paternalists’. Others feel that it is hard to change the political 
system (lower EPE), but they are confident of their own political capabilities (higher IPE). As 
the strong inner motives are at odds with the perceived external opportunities, this group can 
be labeled as ‘skeptics’ (see table 1). 
 
Table 1. The concept of political efficacy 
 Political efficacy 
 high low paternalists skeptics 
external PE + - + - 
internal PE + - - + 
 
 
Political efficacy is usually measured as an index created from several indicators (Campbell et 
al., 1954; Balch, 1974; Craig et al, 1990). Some indicators relate to the external dimensions 
while others to the internal one. The 6 items used in the seventh round of the ESS seem to be 
appropriate to use; it has been demonstrated that the indicators indeed capture two different 
constructs: the external and the internal political efficacy variants. Table 2 shows that these 
items and the results of a confirmatory factor analysis (ESS 7th round) confirm that there are 
indeed two different constructs behind them. The level of agreement with these statements was 
measured on an 11-point scale. 
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Table 2. Results of the confirmatory factor analysis (factor loadings) (Bene, 2019) 
 Factor loadings 
external PE  
How much would you say the political system in 
[country] allows people like you to have a say in 
what the government does? 
.76 
How much would you say that the political system in 
your country allows people like you to have an 
influence on politics? 
.89 
How much would you say that politicians care what 
people like you think? 
.74 
internal PE  
How able do you think you are to take an active role 
in a group involved with political issues? 
.84 
How confident are you in your own ability to 
participate in politics? 
.85 
How easy do you personally find it to take part in 
politics? 
.70 
χ2 2967.33 
df 8 
p .000 
CFI .969 
SRMR .042 
Note: The low level of significance of χ2 test is due to the large sample (see, Schermelleh-
Engel et al, 2003). The other goodness of fit metrics (CFI, SRMR) indicate well-fitting 
models.   
 
 
The eighth round of the ESS included only two internal and two external political efficacy 
items1. The illustration below draws upon those questions. Respondents had to indicate their 
level agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale, where 1 represents the lowest level of 
political efficacy. High level of internal and external political efficacy is established when a 
given respondent marked 3 or above for both questions.  
Table 3. The share of respondents of the 8th round of the ESS based on their level of political efficacy 
Political efficacy 
high low Paternalists skeptics 
10,4 % 61,1 % 14,1 % 14,4 % 
 
These findings indicate that a large majority of respondents has a low level of political efficacy 
in both dimensions. Only 10% of people in the sample are considered to be politically 
efficacious. The results suggest that it is appropriate to distinguish the two mixed types of 
political efficacy, since significant shares of our respondents can be classified by these 
 
1 External dimension: “How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have 
a say in what the government does?” and “And how much would you say that the political system in  
[country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics?”. Internal dimension: “How able do you think 
you are to take an active role in a group involved with political issues?”, and “how confident are you in your own 
ability to participate in politics?”. Answers were measured on 5-point response scales. 
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categories. Almost equal shares of the sample belong to these two mixed forms (paternalists 
and skeptics).  
 
Democratic capacities 
 
Political efficacy is popular in the literature because it has been considered as one of the most 
important predictors of political participation. The decline of political participation was a 
widespread trend in the last decades of the 20th century (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Blais, 
2010). Thus, understanding its roots represented a major challenge for political science. 
However, over the 21 th century, the further existence of this universal trend is not obvious. 
While there are a few countries where such a decline has persisted (France, Italy etc.), the level 
of participation has stabilized in several counties (Finland, Czech Republic, Poland etc.) while 
it has increased in several other western nations such as the US, Germany, the UK, the 
Netherland, Sweden, or Austria2.  
At the same time, another emerging trend of political participation has received increasing 
scholarly and public attention: the rise of populism and illiberalism in modern liberal 
democracies (Mudde, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). While the decline of political 
participation seems to stop or even reverse in several countries, an increasing number of people 
participates in political processes with supporting populist and non-democratic political actors. 
Consequently, it is now the democratic quality of political participation that has become the 
main challenge for political science rather than its level.  
Political efficacy is an important motivational background for political participation, but it says 
nothing about its democratic quality. To make the concept up to the contemporary challenges 
of political science, it seems reasonable to supplement it with a democratic component. We 
propose that democratic participation is enabled by a higher level of political efficacy that is 
paired with certain democratic capacities. 
The normative theories of democracies impose certain requirements not only on the level of 
political system or the elite, but also on that of the citizens. According to these, ideal democracy 
can only work if citizens have certain democratic capacities. For instance, some degree of 
information is needed and desired if they are to substantively participate in politics (Carpini – 
Keeter, 1996). In democratic settings, citizens have to make decisions on the most important 
political questions. Besides, decision-making based on relevant information is more likely to 
reflect voters’ true preferences. Consequently, citizens need to have some general political 
knowledge, but also keep up with the day-to-day political processes. However, having political 
knowledge and being up-to-date are not enough to make informed political decisions. Citizens 
have to be reflective about their decisions and base their choices and political preferences on 
them (Dewey, 1954).  
However, strong emotional attachments may undermine this reflexivity and introduce serious 
biases in reasoning and evaluation of political information (Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2008; 
Petersen et al, 2013). Further, the idea of democracy is based on some core values that citizens 
are required to embrace in order to make it work properly. First, citizens’ political and legal 
equality is a prerequisite of democracy (Dahl, 1956). Second, the normative justification of 
 
2 see, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/continent-view/Europe/40 
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democracy rests upon the premise that citizens are capable of making free and autonomous 
decisions (Lakoff, 1990). Third, democracy is a social activity where individuals have to 
consider that others also have legitimate interests, opinions, and values. Citizens have to tolerate 
and listen to opinions different from their own, because democracy is based on the idea of 
exchanging and confronting competing views and interests (Arendt, 1968; Mutz, 2006). These 
values correspond to the three core values of democracy. Namely, the equality of interests, and 
the political autonomy and reciprocity, as conceptualized by Brettscheneider (2006). Also, 
certain political or civic skills have long been considered to represent crucial democratic 
capacities (Verba et al, 1995). We assume that coping with populism requires specific skills. 
For example, the quality of being able to deal with plurality and conflicts in politics and policy; 
practicing empathy towards others’ legitimate needs and goals; scrutinizing leaders and their 
decisions; consuming media content in a reflective manner (media literacy); and being able to 
express one’s own legitimate needs, aspirations, and preferences. 
Several components of democratic capacities stem from the normative notion of the democratic 
citizen described above. Here we lay out these components, suggest items to measure them, and 
try to establish minimal criteria for considering whether someone has such a capacity.  
First, a certain level of factual knowledge of the political system, its actors and processes is a 
crucial democratic capacity. Factual knowledge refers to “declarative knowledge” (Eveland et 
al, 2004: 87) of political institutions and actors. We argue that some level of factual knowledge 
is a prerequisite for a normatively desired democratic political behavior. That is usually 
measured by test-like questions. In cross-national research design, questions should be very 
carefully selected, as most of these are highly context-bound. The following open questions are 
proposed to measure political knowledge in the DEMOS project.  
1. Which is the biggest party group in the European Parliament? 
2. Who is the current President of the European Commission? 
3. Who is the current Minister (Secretary – UK) of Foreign Affairs in your country? 
4. How many votes do you cast on nationwide (federal) general elections? 
5. Normally, how often do general elections take place in your country? (… years) 
6. What is the only country that decided to leave the European Union? 
A moderate level of political knowledge is required for establishing democratic capacity. 
Accordingly, we consider three right answers to the questions above as the minimum criteria.  
However, politics is a vivid, continuously evolving sphere. In order to have sufficient 
information to make choices, people need to keep up with the latest developments, and actively 
monitor news on politics. As such, having a certain level of political information consumption 
can also indicate better democratic capacity. We argue that a person who deliberately consumes 
news a few times a week can be regarded as a regular news consumer. This is an important 
aspect of our concept of ‘democratic capacities’. To measure news consumption, we propose 
the following question: 
How often do you deliberately choose to read, listen or watch news from television, radio, 
newspaper, or news website? 
- never 
- only occasionally 
- A few times a week 
- most days 
- every day  
Also, as strong emotional attachment is detrimental to reflective processing of information, 
strong political attachment contradicts democratic ideals. However, literature also demonstrated 
that partisan feelings are important to democratic behavior as motivational background for 
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participation and base of stability of policy preferences (Converse, 1969; Abramson & Aldrich, 
1982). In this sense, moderate partisan sentiments are not considered problematic for enabling 
democratic behavior; only strong emotional attachment is difficult to reconcile with democratic 
ideals. Emotional attachment to parties is usually measured by asking respondents how close 
they feel themselves to their favorite party. Yet, this question is not sophisticated enough to 
capture emotional identifications. Hereby, we propose a unique index for measuring emotional 
attachment more deeply: 
Please think of the party you would vote for if the elections were to be held next Sunday?  
1. On the whole, how much do you like this party? (0-10 totally dislike – totally like) 
2. And how much do you like the official leader of this party? (0-10 totally dislike – totally like) 
3. How often do you disagree with things this party and its politicians say or do? (0-10 never – 
all the time) 
Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements (0-10 
totally disagree – totally agree): 
4. this party wants the best for people like me. 
5. this party holds the same values like me.  
6. this party do not lie for people. 
An index can be created from these items and only the highest scores (e.g. mean value above 
7) could represent a problem for democratic efficacy.  
Identifying with the core values of democracy is also a crucial trait of democratic citizens. 
People conforming to the normative ideal of citizens embrace the idea of political and legal 
equality for all citizens and are open with and tolerant toward dissenting opinions; they also 
feel themselves capable of making free and autonomous decisions (see e.g. Welzel – Inglehart, 
2008). The following questions can be used for measuring the degree of identification with 
these core values. Values above five indicate a certain degree of agreement; thus, we consider 
these respondents to have such democratic capacities. 
How much do you agree with the following statements (0 – 10 disagree - agree): 
1. I think it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. 
2. It is important to listen to people who are different from me even if I disagree with their views. 
3. It is important for me to make my own decisions about what I do freely and independently of 
others.  
(Based on the 8th round of the ESS, with some modification.) 
Scholarship seems to face a paradoxical situation when it comes to political skills. While it is 
acknowledged that being involved in politics (Verba et al., 1995) necessitates some knowledge 
and skills—especially in increasingly complex liberal democracies—research has largely 
neglected the latter in terms of operationalization and conceptualization (on this, see Kirlin, 
2005). In a political context, the Civic Voluntarism Model of Verba et al. (1995) defines ‘civic 
skills’ as “organizational and communication skills, which allow the use of time and money 
effectively in a political arena.” Verba et al. (2009) also uses the term ‘civic skills’ to describe 
‘skills which are relevant for political competence.’ To measure these abilities, scholars have 
surveyed if respondents, within a period of six months, have: written a letter to a politician, 
gone to a meeting where they took part in a decision, planned or chaired a meeting, or given a 
presentation or a speech. It is obvious that political participation and activities are not identical 
with political skills, but given the fact that skills cannot be properly captured by survey 
questions, the level of political involvement is an often-used proxy for political skills: those 
who are involved in political activities are more likely to have political and civic skills because 
skills are evolving during these activities. Consequently, a political participation scale is used 
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as a proxy for political skills. If a respondent has been involved in any of the listed activity 
forms, she meets the minimum criterion for having democratic capacities.  
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent15 things from going 
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you… 
 
1. …contacted a politician, government, or local government official?  
2. …worked in a political party or action group?  
3. …worked in another organization or association?  
4. …worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?  
5. …signed a petition?  
6. …taken part in a lawful public demonstration?  
7. …boycotted certain products?  
8. …posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via email, or on 
social media such as Facebook or Twitter? 
   
(From the 8th round of the ESS.) 
In our conceptualization, people with complete democratic capacities have (1) a certain level 
of factual political knowledge; (2) consumed news regularly; (3) non-intensive partisanship; 
(4) identities with the core values of democracy—i.e., political and legal equality, tolerance 
toward dissenting opinion, and individual autonomy—and (5) some involvement in political 
activities.  
 
Table 4. The concept of democratic capacities 
 political 
knowledge 
political news 
consumption 
political 
attachment 
Identification with values political 
activity 
    equality toleranc
e 
autonomy  
Citizens 
with 
complete 
democrati
c 
capacities 
+ 
at least 3 
right 
answers  
regular (at 
least few 
times a week) 
not 
extremely 
high 
(below 
mean value 
of 7) 
+ 
above 5 
+ 
above 5 
+ 
above 5 
not 
entirely 
passive 
(at least 
1 
activity) 
 
The 8th round of the ESS conducted between 2016-2017 contained items for all these variables 
with the exception of political knowledge. This limits the illustration below to political news 
consumption, partisanship, identification with core values of democracy, and political activity.  
To measure political news consumption, the ESS questionnaire asks how many minutes a 
respondent spends consuming political news per day. This way of posing the question resulted 
in answers where the large majority of respondents were counted as daily news consumers since 
only 6% of them indicated 0 minute. This result contradicts the findings of previous research 
(see e.g. Ksiazek et al, 2010; Prior, 2007), thereby it should be treated with caution. Still, the 
statistical variances observed among individuals may indicate actual differences in news 
consumption. In DEMOS, we consider a “regular news consumer” to be someone who 
consumes news at least several times a week. However, because of the specific question 
mentioned above and the distribution of answers, in this illustrative case we will consider 
regular news consumers to be the respondents who read, watch, or listen to news at least 30 
minutes per day. Partisanship closeness to a political party was measured on a 4-point scale, 
and only the extreme value indicating ‘very close’ was regarded as a highly partisan answer. 
Participants were also asked to what extent they identify with certain character types and values 
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on a 6-points scale. Three items of the ESS survey are closely related to the three core values 
of democracy discussed above.3 In detail, 1 and 2 values indicate identification with these 
statements as they were labeled as ‘very much like me’ and ‘like me’ respectively. Our political 
activity measure was based on the ESS questionnaire, thus it is here exactly what we described 
above. Table 5 shows the share of respondents who meet these criteria for each component of 
our democratic capacities concept.  
Table 5. The share of respondents of the 8th round of the ESS based on specific democratic capacities 
 news 
consumption 
partisanship equality tolerance autonomy political 
activity 
criteria at least 30 
min per day 
1 – 3 /4-
point scale  
1-2/6-
point scale 
1-2/6-
point scale 
1-2/6-point 
scale 
at least 
1 
+ 79,4 % 95,2 % 71,5 % 65,2 % 68,5 % 52% 
       
The findings above suggest that all of these capacities are widely shared in the democratic 
countries under investigation. The large majority of respondents share the following democratic 
capacities: they consume news regularly, are non-intensive partisans, and they believe in the 
values of equality, tolerance, and individual autonomy. More than half of them have been 
involved in at least one political activity during the preceding 12 months. 
However, table 6 indicates that their combined presence is not as universal: only a fifth of the 
respondents have all these democratic capacities, while the large majority of respondents have 
incomplete capacities. These findings suggest that these capacities are suitable to let us 
categorize respondents: the validity of them is supported by their wide presence in democratic 
countries, and their combined occurrence can differentiate people with more or less democratic 
capacities. 
Table 6. The share of respondents of the 8th round of the ESS based on the mixture of their democratic capacities 
People with complete democratic capacities People with incomplete democratic capacities 
19,5 % 80,5 % 
 
Democratic efficacy    
 
After conceptualizing democratic capacities, the concept of political efficacy can be 
supplemented with a democratic component in order to introduce a quality aspect into the 
original term. While political efficacy is a subjective attitude toward politics that is crucial as a 
motivational background of political behavior, democratic behavior requires some objective 
capacities as well. The concept of democratic capacities supplement this subjective construct 
(political efficacy) with these objective requirements. As a result, the concept of democratic 
efficacy, taken as a more nuanced approach to political efficacy, may provide an appropriate 
 
3 (1) She thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She believes everyone 
should have equal opportunities in life. (2) It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her. 
Even when she disagrees with them, she still wants to understand them. (3) It is important for her to make her own 
decisions about what she does. She likes to be free and not depend on others.  
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framework for understanding democratic political behavior, which is one of the most important 
themes of the DEMOS project.  
We conceptualize democratic efficacy not as a linear but as a two-dimensional concept. It would 
not make sense to simply add the measures of democratic capacities to those of political 
efficacy: we believe it is conceptually more sound and more interesting to capture the different 
combinations of the two sets of measures. 
Theoretically, pairing the two concepts makes sense only if they are not highly correlated with 
each other. As long as people with high level of political efficacy are exactly those who have 
complete democratic capacities, the latter component would not make any substantial 
contribution to the original concept. Connecting the term of political efficacy to the democratic 
capacities is meaningful if the latter makes relevant distinctions within categories of political 
efficacy and help differentiate people with the same level of PE.  
A chi-squared independence test was performed to check whether the two categorical-level 
variables (PE and democratic capacities) are related in any way. The two components are not 
entirely independent of each other. A significant (p < .001), but modest (Cramer’s V  = .213) 
relationship exists between the two-level democratic capacities component and the four-level 
political efficacy component. However, table 7 indicates that the democratic component yield 
a more nuanced picture of political efficacy. More precisely, the cells of Table 7 provide 
different forms of democratic efficacy. 
 
Table 7. The share of respondents of the 8th round of the ESS based on democratic efficacy 
democratic 
capacities 
Political efficacy Total 
high low paternalist skeptics 
democratic 
capacities 
3,7 % 8,3 % 2,9 % 4,5 % 19,5 % 
incomplete 
capacities 
6,6 % 52,9 % 11,1 % 9,9 % 80,5 % 
Total 10,4 % 61,1 % 14,1 % 14,4 % 100% 
 
Let us interpret the most interesting categories with a focus on populism.  
Almost two thirds of the respondents with a high level of political efficacy have incomplete 
democratic capacities. In principle, those people are active in politics, although their democratic 
skills fall short of the democratic ideal. We assume that this group might be more open to 
populism than people with both high political efficacy and complete democratic capacities. Of 
course, here we took a very strict approach, grouping all the respondents under the label of 
‘incomplete capacities’ who underperform at least in one capacity measure. It is very likely that 
the low value of a single capacity measure does not signal the same level of ‘incompleteness’ 
than a general lack of democratic capacities. As a result, empirically speaking, it seems useful 
to create different categories of people with incomplete capacities, according to the number of 
capacity measure they underperform in.  
The category of people with incomplete capacities and low political efficacy is theoretically not 
so challenging: those are the ones who are not interested in politics and probably have low 
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political activity level as well. However, they are very important from a policy perspective. The 
question is what could be done in order to increase their democratic skills and political efficacy 
feelings. A related question is whether they are open toward populist arguments or their low 
interest in politics makes them largely immune to populist arguments.  
At the same time, a minority of people with a low level of political efficacy has complete 
democratic capacities. Those people are interested in politics, consume the media, have high 
democratic values, and are active in politics while they do not feel that they can change politics. 
They seem to have a general skeptical attitude toward politics. It is also remarkable that a larger 
share of skeptics have complete democratic capacities than paternalist citizens. This is in line 
with the theoretical construct: we expect people with complete democratic capacities to believe 
in themselves and share a more skeptical attitude – if so – toward the political system. A 
possible hypothesis is that those skeptical people with high democratic capacities might be open 
to populist arguments, as they seem not to trust the political system.  
Overall, it has turned out that the democratic component is suitable to introduce an additional 
analytical distinction into the concept of political efficacy, which may help capture behavioral 
outcomes more precisely. 
 
 
The role of context  
 
However, citizens’ behavioral outcomes may also be shaped by the political and media contexts 
where respondents who are characterized by certain types of democratic efficacy live. The role 
of context in this conceptualization is twofold. First, contextual variables should be applied as 
predictors that explain the way context shapes the level of citizens’ democratic efficacy. At the 
same time, we assume democratic efficacy works differently in varying contexts and that 
contextual variables are crucial moderators when the behavioral consequences of democratic 
efficacy are investigated. The same level of democratic efficacy may be associated with 
different outcomes depending on the specific context. 
In a strict sense, the context is not part of the core concept of democratic efficacy, but it is worth 
mentioning its role here because that may be important at the empirical level. And there is a 
related conceptual problem: what kind of contexts might be relevant for interpreting democratic 
efficacy? Building on the elements of the concept of democratic efficacy as presented above, 
we argue that the following contextual dimensions and variables may be relevant: 
- political system: measures of the quality of democracy, features of the political system (e.g., 
consensual or majoritarian, electoral systems), the share of redistribution; 
- media system: measures of press freedom, public trust in the media, journalists’ role conception, 
the role of social media in news consumption; 
- education: measures of the quality of the educational system (PISA), public expenditures on 
education, civic education. 
Finally, as a general contextual variable, the level of economic development and its measures 
(GDP per capita, HDI) should also be considered.  
Of course, the actual role of those contextual factors in either predicting or modifying 
democratic efficacy can only be determined through empirical analysis.  
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The above mentioned indicators and similar ones that capture individual countries’ 
institutional, cultural, political- and media system-related features are available from 
international datasets. We present a selective collection of these indicators in table 8. 
Table 8. Indicators for measuring the effects of contextual predictors and moderators 
Dimension Aspect Source 
Media system 
 
 
 
Press Freedom Freedom House 
Political parallelism of media 
system 
European Media System 
Survey (EMSS) (calculation 
based on Lelkes, 2016) 
Level of political interference 
in the work of media outlets 
EMSS, The World of 
Journalism Study (WJS) 
Level of economic interference 
in the work of media outlets 
WJS 
Political significance of mass 
media 
EMSS 
Credibility of media outlets in 
the public eyes 
EMSS, Reuters Institute Digital 
News Report (RI-DNR) 
Journalists’ role conceptions WJS 
Role of social media in news 
consumption 
RI-DNR 
Education 
Public expenditure on 
education 
OECD Education 
Students’ results from PISA 
tests 
OECD PISA 
Citizenship education at School 
(existence & hours/week) 
Eurydice – Citizenship 
Education at School in Europe 
Political system 
Quality of Democracy Democracy Index of The 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
How long has the particular 
country been democratic? 
Comparative Political Data Set 
(CPDS) 
The responsiveness/openness 
of the political system 
World Bank – Voice and 
Accountability index 
Electoral fractionalization of 
the party system 
CPDS 
Effective number of political 
parties 
CPDS 
Disproportionality of the ––
electoral system 
CPDS 
Consensual or majoritarian 
political system 
CPDS 
the degree of government 
spending in the share of GDP 
CPDS 
Corruption Transparency International 
Economy 
GDP per capita OECD 
the mean level of GDP growth 
in the last five years 
CPDS, OECD 
HDI (Human Development 
Index)  
United Nations Human 
Development Report 
Openness of the economy CPDS 
Gini-index (measurement of 
inequality of income) 
World Bank 
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